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PRESEXTIOII BY 



THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 






BY 

WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD. 



REPRINTED FROM POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 
Vol. XIX., No. 3. 



BOSTON. 
PUBLISHED BY GINN & CO., 

1904. 




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THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 

PRESENT appreciation of the value of the Louisiana terri- 
tory, and the estimate put upon it by France and Spain 
while they were its actual possessors, afford one of the most re- 
markable contrasts in history. The willingness of Spain to ex- 
change the tract for a petty kingdom in northern Italy, the readi- 
ness of Napoleon to surrender it for a quite insignificant sum of 
money, and the consternation felt in the United States itself over 
the gigantic landsUde from beyond the Mississippi, are too well 
known to need further comment. These conditions of mind will, 
at any rate, bear profitable comparison with the spirit of France in 
1762 when ceding Louisiana to Spain, and with the feelings of 
that country in accepting it. Save as a matter of policy,^ France 
displayed the utmost indifference as to the fate of its American 
colony. To both powers Louisiana was not merely destitute of 
intrinsic value, it entailed a positive deficit.^ Its alienation would 
confer an advantage upon the donor, and entail a corresponding 
loss to the recipient. Ignorance, neglect and maladministration 
had brought on so much expense and vexation, that France felt 
inclined to rehnquish the burden, although with a show of mag- 
nanimity that faintly concealed her actual sense of relief, while 
Spain took up the unwieldy mass with a display of gratitude that 
poorly masked her own chagrin. Compared with these circum- 
stances, the attitude of France and Spain at the opening of the 
nineteenth century would seem to betoken a real reluctance in 
parting with the Louisiana territory. That of the United States 
in receiving it would appear one of positive eagerness. 

Various considerations had induced Spain to participate in the 

* See infra, p. 447, et seq. 

^ One of the most noted of recent Spanish historians has ventured the surprising 
statement that "the exploitation of the gold mines along the Mississippi brought 
quite a number of colonists to Louisiana." Damila, Historia del Reinado de 
Carlos III, t. iv, p. 74. Had such mines really existed, the history of the Spaniard 
in America affords some reason to believe that alacrity, and not reluctance, would 
have marked the attitude of Spain in reference to accepting Louisiana from France, 

439 



440 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX. 

war that deprived her of Florida and gave her Louisiana. With 
growing uneasiness the court of Madrid had watched the dimin- 
ution of the French power in the North American continent. It 
feared that when once the colonial balance of France and England 
had been destroyed, the Spanish American dominions would be- 
come the object of EngHsh ambition and enterprise. In this 
opinion Spain was encouraged by the conduct of England her- 
self. The British had adhered tenaciously to their settlements 
in Honduras, and had carried on a profitable contraband trade 
with the Spanish colonies elsewhere. A senSe of community, 
also, in the affairs of the two great representatives of the Bourbon 
dynasty exercised considerable influence on Charles III. The 
misfortunes of his royal "brother and cousin," Louis XV, and 
the skill with which the latter and his ministers utihzed them in 
appealing to the sentiment of dynastic affection, weaned the 
Spanish king from the prudent attitude of neutrality which he 
had observed during the earher years of the war. A futile effort 
to mediate on behalf of France was followed by the formation of 
/ the third Family Compact, August 15, 1761.^ 

Whatever might have been the spirit of this agreement, it was 
not specifically an alliance against Great Britain. That was not 
concluded until February 4, 1762,^ about a month after Great 
Britain, aware of the eventual purpose of the new combination 
of the Bourbon courts, itself had declared war on Spain. In as- 
sociating himself with Louis XV on this occasion, Charles III 
simply became the "cat's-paw" member of the Bourbon aUiance, 
precisely as the French monarch had been enacting that role in 
his connection with Austria. Sentimental sympatiiy for his 
Bourbon kinsman, and the fear of British colonial designs bhnded 
Charles III to the actual plight of France, and to the great strength, 
almost undiminished, of the English adversary. Fatuously he 
assumed the task of fighting for a cause already lost; the act 
brought in its train naught but defeat and humiliation.^ 

' Cantillo, Tratados, convenios y declaraciones de paz y de comercio, p. 468, et seq 
^ "Convencion particular de alianza, ofensiva y defensiva entre las coronas de 

Espana y Francia contra la Gran Bretana." Ibid., p. 482 et seq. 

^ In view of the utter overthrow of the French colonial dominion which had 

been attained by the time the Family Compact was signed, the language of that 



No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 441 

No sooner had Spain embarked in the war than she assumed 
an active share in the negotiations, already pending, for peace. 
The only section of the preliminary articles under consideration 
in July, 1762, which concerned Spain, w^as that relating to the 
proposed boundary of Canada on the south and west. By the 
sixth article as then constituted, France had agreed to cede to 
Great Britain the left bank of the Mississippi as far as the river 
Iberville and Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, thus making 
the Mississippi the boundary between Canada and Louisiana.^ 
Forthwith the Marquis of Grimaldi, the Spanish ambassador, pro- 
tested to the Duke of Choiseul against this virtual cession of a 
part of Louisiana ^ under the guise of merely fixing the boundary 
line of Canada.^ Such a procedure, he argued, would give the 
EngUsh an easy outlet to the Gulf of Mexico. So abhorrent was 
the idea to the Spanish mind that he even expressed a doubt 
whether his royal master would ever conclude peace, should the 
meaning of the article be so construed. He thus intimated that 



staid document in reference to compensation for gains and losses seems almost 
jocose. It says: "Their Catholic and Christian Majesties have agreed that, when 
the question of peace shall have arisen at the close of the war which they may have 
carried on in common, the advantages gained by one of the two powers shall com- 
pensate for the losses the other may have sustained." Ibid., p. 471, art. xviii. 
Nor does the humorous aspect disappear in the wording of the actual treaty of 
alliance between Charles and Louis, wherein it is stated that "from the day of the 
date of this convention the losses and gains shall be common." Ibid., p. 483, art. 
iii. The issue of the war certainly enabled Spain to fulfill her treaty obligations, 
for she shared the losses and — in the minus degree — the gains! Cantillo very 
properly remarks that for considerations of "mere family affection the blood and 
interests of an entire people [i.e. the Spanish] were compromised in the blunders 
and caprices of a foreign monarch." Ibid., p. 474. 

' "La France accorde que la fleuve de Mississippi serve aux deux nations de 
limites entre la Louisiane et le Canada, de maniere que la rive gauche de ce fleuve 
appartienne a la Grande Bretagne jusqu' a la riviere Iberville et les lacs Maure- 
pas et Pontchartrain." Projet d'articles preliminaires arrettes (sic) entre la 
France et I'Angleterre, Art. vi. Archivo General de Simancas. Estado, Legajo, 
4551- 

^ Elsewhere in the preliminary Articles the river and part of Mobile were in- 
cluded in the French cession to Great Britain. 

' It must be remembered of course, that during the French occupation no defi- 
nite line of territorial di\asion between Canada and Louisiana as provinces had 
ever been established. Nor did the maps of the period render the task of the dip- 
lomats any easier. 



442 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX. 

France was not at liberty to dispose of Louisiana without the 
consent of Spain. The suggestion provoked from the Count of 
Choiseul, the duke's younger brother, who was present at the 
conference, the sharp rejoinder that it seemed rather odd for Spain 
to lay down the law to France regarding the latter's own property, 
especially since under the circumstances the English might de- 
cline altogether to entertain the proposition.^ Choiseul hastened 
to rebuke this youthful outburst, and answering Grimaldi's objec- 
tion, said that the sense in which the article was couched ought to 
be clear enough to relieve the Spaniards of any such apprehension. 
If that were insufficient, the map that was to accompany the de- 
finitive treaty would indicate precisely the extent of the proposed 
cession. He declared that, since the river Iberville and the two 
lakes were to remain in the possession of France, the further 
navigation of the Mississippi by the English toward the Gulf of 
Mexico would be barred at that point. At least such was the 
present attitude of France on the subject. In the event of Great 
Britain's being dissatisfied with the arrangement, certainly nothing 
would be done, asserted Choiseul, in reference to ascertaining the 
boundary between Canada and Louisiana, without a previous 
agreement between the two Bourbon monarchs.^ 

Up to August, 1762, Grimaldi had received no precise instruc- 
tions to govern his conduct in the negotiations, but his doubt in 
reference to the boundary of Canada was well substantiated in 
the orders that then came from Ricardo Wall, the Spanish chief 
minister of state. The instructions pointed out how utterly op- 
posed the king of Spain was to any cession whereby the English 
might get a foothold on the Gulf of Mexico, or even hope to be 
able to reach that body of water. That Canada ever extended so 
far to the south as the French had maintained was preposterous. 
"The English on their part ought not to claim any port of Lou- 
isiana itself as a boundary between that province and Canada," 
wrote Wall, "for to do this one would have to stretch Canada 
southward to a point it never attained. Nor are the French free 

^ Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 4551. Grimaldi to Choiseul, July 20, 1762, and 
to Wall, July 22 and August 19, 1762. 

^ Ibid. Choiseul to Grimaldi, July 21, 1762; Grimaldi to Wall, August 20, 
1762. 



No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 443 

to dispose of possessions the right to which Spain, as the legiti- 
mate owner, has never conceded." However, since his Majesty 
had resolved to 

cooperate in every way so as to secure a lasting peace, it would be 
better to fix boundaries between the several possessions as they actu- 
ally exist, although up to the present time some of them may not have 
been recognized by Spain as unquestionably parts of the royal domin- 
ions, Louisiana and Georgia, in particular, belonging to this class. 

So far as Canada was concerned, he thought that the latitude of 
the Carolinas might well serve as an approximate line of demarca- 
tion between the French and Spanish territories.^ 

Armed with these instructions, Grimaldi notified Choiseul that 
he was ready to produce legal and historical proofs whenever it 
might be needful to substantiate the Spanish claim to Louisiana,^ 
at least so far as determining the extent to which the province 
might be ahenated to a third power. The matter of capital 
importance to Spain at the existing stage of the negotiation, he 



* Ibid. Wall to Grimaldi, August 2, 1762. 

" "I do not believe it necessary to prove the king's right to Louisiana, but in 
order that one may provide for all possible contingencies, it might be well to have 
ready and at hand a memorial with the proofs of that right, such as are indicated 
in the enclosed sheet — those of which all the European powers have availed them- 
selves to estabUsh the legitimacy of their conquests and possessions in America. 

" Mem^orial which proves : 

" I. That the Spaniards discovered and explored all the region or coasts that 
surround the Gulf of Mexico. 

" 2. That they have taken possession of the same, and have performed those 
acts of jurisdiction and dominion whereby the European powers attest their right 
to the countries of America. 

" 3. That by reason of the enormous extension, Spain has not populated all 
the region, in which time \sic\ the French made their way to the River Mississippi 
and to Louisiana. 

"4. That their settlement is not legitimate nor recognized by Spain, in proof of 
which during the reigns of Philip V in Spain and of Louis XIV in France, the 
French were ejected from it by armed force. 

" 5. That the previous toleration by Spain neither lessens her own right, nor 
gives weight to the claims of France, etc." Ibid. Grimaldi to Wall, August 20, 
1762. In his fourth "proof" Grimaldi, it would seem, refers to Juchereau de 
Saint Denys' exploring trip to the southwest of Louisiana in 1716. See Garri- 
son, Texas (American Commonwealths Series), ch. v, and Winsor, The Mississippi 
Basin, 90-9S, and the authorities therein cited. 



444 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX. 

urged, was not only that the English possessions on the continent 
of North America should be kept at a remote distance from the 
shores of the Gulf of Mexico, but also that both banks of the Mis- 
sissippi for a like distance should continue to belong to France. 
In the opinion of the Spanish ambassador, this would be the best 
means of preventing English vessels from entering the river from 
the gulf itself. "So essential is this point regarded in Spain," 
concluded Grimaldi, "that until his uneasiness vanishes and his 
mind is made tranquil, the king cannot lend himself to peace 
according to the measure of his desires."^ In reply to this repe- 
tition of an earlier threat, Choiseul explained that England had 
already dechned to accept any such adjustment of the matter at 
issue. Thereupon Grimaldi suggested that a neutral and desert 
zone be erected between the southern boundary of Canada even 
as far south as the latitude of lower Georgia on the one side, and 
the remainder of Louisiana and the Spanish territories on the 
other.* Such was the state of affairs on September 17, when 
the Duke of Bedford, the British commissioner, became one of the 
participants in the discussion. 

Informed of the approaching arrival of Bedford, Wall now sent 
Grimaldi a new set of instructions. Their main purpose was to 
gain, if possible, some real advantage, territorial or commercial, 
which would serve either as a reimbursement for the expense of 
the aid afforded to France, or as an offset to the losses Spain 
might have to undergo from British conquests.^ Rumors of dis- 
aster at Havana gave a tinge of foreboding and precaution, fur- 

^ Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 4551. Grimaldi to Choiseul, August 13, 1762. 

^ Ihid. Wall to Grimaldi, September 5, 1762, and Grimaldi to Choiseul, Sep- 
tember 15, 1762. "Moyens de regler les articles de I'Espagne avec I'Angleterre." 

^ "Considering that the king has performed the service of reheving the king, 
his cousin, from an oppressive war, if he can obtain some compensation for the 
injuries he has sustained . . . how can one believe that he would decline it? ' 
Ihid. Wall to Grimaldi, September 16, 1762. "Although his Majesty has not 
proposed any advantages for himself, should England offer any ... it would be 
foolish not to accept them, and not be the gainer by the proposals of our enemies, 
securing some just indemnity for the expense and losses. To this end you have 
ordered me to treat of these compensations in exchange for the restitutions that 
we shall have to make." Ibid., Grimaldi to Wall, September 13, 1762. The 
"restitutions" refer to the territory captured from Portugal in the region of the 
Rio de la Plata. 



No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 445 

thermore, to the instructions. Grimaldi was bidden not to insist 
upon the Spanish claims so far as to break off the negotiations/ 
and he must yield all if Havana should have fallen.^ 

In his deaUngs with Choiseul and Bedford, obedient to the in- 
structions, Grimaldi laid all the stress possible on the benevolent 
and disinterested motives of his royal master.^ He asserted that 
on the point of requiring indemnification for any restitutions that 
Spain might be obliged to make, his orders were absolute. At 
the same time the Spanish ambassador deftly insinuated that the 
wilhngness of his CathoHc Majesty to hasten the approach of 
peace would always exercise a modifying force — "an expression 
of which I availed myself," he wrote to Wall, "as an excuse in 
case I were compelled to reHnquish all as a prevention of rupture 
in the negotiations." ^ Apparently the only thing that made this 
threadbare diplomatic trick so successful as to disquiet even Choi- 
seul, was the rather unusual circumstance that the Marquis 
d'Ossun, the French ambassador at Madrid, had not been able to 
elicit an inkling of Grimaldi's orders.^ 

At the opening conference of the commissioners of the three 
powers, much to Grimaldi's consternation, the Duke of Bedford 
submitted a new version of the sixth article of the preHminaries, 
and with the character of a sine qua non. This provided that the 
line of demarcation between Canada and Louisiana should be 
traced along the Mississippi and the river Iberville, straight through 
Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the Gulf of Mexico. The 
navigation of the Mississippi, furthermore, from its source to its 

' "Perhaps if the Duke of Bedford could be persuaded to believe that he might 
be allowed to return to London with the discomfiture of not having accomplished 
anything, he might agree to yield in some respect . . . but if wdth all this the 
outcome should be naught, then bow the head and sign." Ibid., Wall to Grimaldi, 
September 29, 1762. 

^ The possession of the stronghold of Havana, as the key to the Gulf of Mexico, 
and to her colonial dominions near and around that body of water was of course 
indispensable to Spain. 

' Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 4551, Grimaldi to Wall, September 24, 1762. 

* Ibid., September 19, 1762. 

^ "Since the character of the French nation is so hght and hasty, if they were 
to know the actual degree to which the condescension of his Majesty extends, even 
were their intentions toward us the best in the world, they would give up every 
thing in one moment or another." Ibid. 



446 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX. 

mouth was to be common to the vessels of both Great Britain 
and France. When Grimaldi endeavored to give force to the 
claim of Spain to Louisiana, as thereby entithng her to a voice in 
the disposition of that province, Bedford remarked, rather tartly, 
that although Spain did seem to claim all of America, there were 
other nations in the world owning considerable parts of the west- 
ern continents, and they had strength enough as well to make 
their possession valid. Louisiana, he continued excitedly, was 
now held by the French; if it belonged to Spain the intruders 
should have been expelled long before. Moreover, he professed 
to be astonished not so much that Spain should try to hinder 
France from disposing of her own property as she saw fit, but 
that the forbearance of Louis XV had lasted so long. To this 
exhibition of bluster, Grimaldi repHed quietly, that Spain merely 
desired to fix reasonable boundaries among the colonial posses- 
sions of the three powers concerned. Spain, therefore, was will- 
ing to relinquish her claim to Georgia, and to accept any fair 
adjustment of the Florida divisional Hne. At this juncture Choi- 
seul observed that without the consent of Spain, France would 
not conclude peace. "So much the worse for you," retorted 
Bedford savagely, and the conference came to an abrupt close. 
Later Choiseul warned Grimaldi that Spain was not in a position 
to withstand the British demands, and that peace must be pro- 
cured at almost any cost.^ Of these circumstances the Spanish 
envoy was perfectly aware, and as already noted,^ his instructions 
had been such as to make Choiseul's chiding advice quite super- 
fluous. 

Perceiving that Bedford was absolutely inflexible^ in his de- 
mands regarding the navigation of the Mississippi, Choiseul felt 
obhged to contrive some means of satisfying Grimaldi without 
modifying the British ultimatum in any essential degree. He 
confessed to Ossun that he was puzzled to know why Spain would 
not accept the preliminary article as Bedford had offered it. He 

' Simancas, Legajo, 4551, Grimaldi to Wall, September 19, 1762. 

^ Supra, p. 445, note i. 

^ "I doubt whether the universe could succeed in making him change a word; 
why, I have not been able to induce him even to convert the articles he has pro- 
posed into better French!" lUd., Choiseul to Ossun, September 20, 1762. 



No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 447 

found nothing in it to injure the interests or pretensions of Spain. 
Unable to divine the motives of the Spanish opposition, he haz- 
arded the assumption that Spain objected to the danger of contra- 
band trade in case EngUsh vessels were allowed to enter the Mis- 
sissippi from the Gulf of Mexico. But according to the literal 
wording of Bedford's demand, only the navigation down the river 
was in question. And if it were the fear of an attack on Florida 
that actuated the Spaniards, it certainly appeared easier to assail 
that colony from the direction of Georgia than from that of the 
Mississippi region. Impelled at length by what he believed to be 
a necessity, he submitted to Bedford a new article composed in 
the following form : 

France consents to extend the boundaries of Canada as far as the river 
Mississippi, which is to serve as a barrier and [the navigation of which] 
will be common to both crowns; but it is agreed that the possession of 
New Orleans shall remain with France.* 

"In any case," he wrote to Ossun, 

whether 4t be this our latest form of the article, or that of England which 
is to be accepted by the two parties, the king has decided in his council 
that he would order the French to evacuate the whole of Louisiana, 
rather than to miss the opportunity for peace on account of the dis- 
cussion about a colony with which we are unable to communicate 
except by sea; which has not, and cannot have, either a port or a road- 
stead into which a xebec of twelve guns could enter, and which costs 
France eight hundred thousand livres a year, without yielding a sou in 
return.^ 

At the same time he directed Ossun to emphasize to Charles III 
the immense risk of renewing the war in case the objections of 
Spain were not withdrawn. In particular, also, he must show 
how wilhng France was to give up Louisiana altogether, and even 
to cause the departure of the French colonists themselves.^ 

* Ibid. "Art. vi; tel qu'il est propose par la France pour moyen de concili- 
ation." 

' Ibid., September 20, 1762. 

* " Representez, Monsieur, la liberty ou est le Roy de ceder et meme de faire 
evacuer ces possessions." Ibid., Choiseul to Ossun, September 20, 1762; Ossun 
to Wall, September 27, 1762. 



448 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XTX. 

Confirmation of the rumors that Havana had surrendered to 
the Enghsh, together with the exhortations of Ossun, caused Wall 
to notify Grimaldi that the final decision of the matters in contro- 
versy was to be left to France. "His Majesty has resolved to 
act generously," wrote Wall, "play the part of the good thief, 
and confide the final determination to the French, placing him- 
self thus in their hands so as to come out as well as possible, or 
let theirs be the fault." ^ 

The capitulation of Havana of course enabled Great Britain to 
render the preliminary articles of peace more severe, and as Gri- 
maldi remarked, to "affect an imperative tone" in most of them.^ 
Not only was the clause in the sixth article about the navigation 
of the Mississippi freed from the ambiguity in regard to the as- 
cent, as well as the descent, of the river,^ but a series of five stip- 
ulations was imposed, on compliance with which Havana would 
be restored to Spain. One of them called for the cession to Eng- 
land of Porto Rico, or of all the Florida region. France was well 
aware that Spain would choose the latter alternative, and sud- 
denly decided to relieve her ally of the necessity of surrendering 
the colony in question. She had already agreed to cede to Great 
Britain all of Louisiana east of the Mississippi. Now she offered 
to that power the remainder of the province west of the river, 
including New Orleans and the island on which the town was 
situated — in other words, the territory comprised within the 
limits of the subsequent Louisiana Purchase. The spontaneous 
ofi'er suited neither England nor Spain. The former rejected it 
as an inadequate substitute for Florida,^ while the latter evinced 
no sentiment of appreciation beyond the mere empty phrases of 
diplomatic compliment. The Spaniards knew well enough how 
slight was the importance that the French attached to Louisiana, 
and hence placed a like estimate upon the sincerity of the trans- 

^ Simancas, Legajo, 4551, Wall to Grimaldi, September 29, 1762. 

^ Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 4552. Grimaldi to Wall, October 29, 1762. 

' "It being understood that the navigation of the Mississippi River is to be 
equally free to the subjects of Great Britain and of France in its whole breadth 
and extent, from its source to the sea ... as well as the entrance and departure 
by its mouth." Cantillo, Tratados de paz, etc., p. 489. Also translated in French, 
Historical Collections of Louisiana, v, p. 240. Cf. supra, pp. 446, 447. 

^ Cf. infra, p. 453 et seq. 



No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 449 

action.^ Grimaldi, in fact, received orders merely to listen to 
whatever might be said on the subject, but to take no further 
interest in it.^ On the whole, Spain felt that the greater prox- 
imity of Louisiana to Mexico warranted rather the sacrifice of 
Florida and the retention of Louisiana in French hands.^ 

The offer of Louisiana to England, however, proved to be the 
prelude to its cession to Spain. Acting under the advice of Choi- 
seul ^ and without any diplomatic overtures whatever,^ Louis XV 
resolved to turn over his worthless colony, as politely as possible, 
to his Spanish "brother and cousin," and his Bourbon kinsman 
received it as gracefully as his conflicting emotions permitted." 
Accordingly, on November 3, 1762, the very day that the prelim- 
inary articles of peace were signed on behalf of the powers con- 
cerned, the French monarch wrote a personal letter to Charles 
III, in which he announced his offer of Louisiana.^ He then 
bade Choiseul prepare a secret act of cession for Grimaldi to sign. 

The formal proceedings of the two diplomats were simple enough. 
On the same morning, before the prehminary articles had been 



* "The French declare that in view of what Spain has done they will them- 
selves assume the indemnity that the enemy asks, but we shall do a very good 
penance just the same for the ravages already suffered. I know that his Most 
Christian Majesty has offered Louisiana [to Great Britain], but I am afraid that 
it will not sufl&ce. . . . We are aware that the French ministers think httle of it." 
Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 4551. Wall to Grimaldi, October 23, 1762. 

2 Ibid. 

^ Archive Historico-Nacional, Madrid. Estado, Legajo, 3889 A. Wall to 
Grimaldi, November 13, 1762. 

* Cf. Gayarre, History of Louisiana, 3d ed. ii, 129. 

^ Archive Historico-Nacional, Madrid. Estado, Legajo, 3889 A. Wall to Gri- 
maldi, November 13, 1762. 

* Cf. infra, p. 451 ei seq. 

The portion of it that relates to Louisiana is as follows: "j'ay obhge sous le 
bon plaisir de V. M'e le M^ de Grimaldi de signer en faveur de I'Espagne la ces- 
sion de la Nouvelle Orleans et de la Louisianne, je I'avois offert aux Anglois a la 
place de la floride; ils m'ont refuse, je leur aurois cede d'autres possessions pour 
eviter a I'Espagne la cession de cette colonie, mais j'ay craint que une cession dans 
le golphe ne tirat trop a consequence, je sens que la Louisianne ne dedomage que 
foiblement V. M'^ des pertes qu'elle a faite dans une guerre aussy courte, entre- 
prise pour la France; mais en lui cedant cette colonie j'en considere moins la 
valeur que le bien qu'elle peut faire a I'union de la Nation Espagnole avec la Fran- 
foise; union qu'il est si necessaire d'etablir soKdement pour I'interet de nos sujets 
ainsy que de notre maison." Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 4552. 



450 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX. 

signed, Choiseul called Grimaldi to his apartments and informed 
him privately that the French monarch was extremely anxious to 
indemnify his Catholic cousin of Spain for the sacrifice of Florida. 
To this end, declared Choiseul, enthusiastically, his royal master 
was ready to give up any part of his dominions. As a proof of 
this willingness Louis XV had determined to cede Louisiana to 
Spain. He had not made the offer of that province to England 
more tempting by the inclusion of St. Lucia, asserted Choiseul, 
because he feared the possible consequences to both the French 
and Spanish colonies of any increase of English power in the 
neighborhood of the Antilles.^ But should his Bourbon relative 
deem Louisiana insufficient to atone for the loss of Florida, the 
French monarch would evince his gratitude and good will by the 
addition of St. Lucia as well.^ Choiseul thereupon handed Gri- 
maldi the royal letter and the act of cession of Louisiana. The 
Spanish ambassador signed the act tentatively, awaiting the pleas- 
/ ure of his royal master.^ In this letter of transmission to Wall, 
however, he intimated his suspicion as to the real nature of Choi- 
seul's enthusiasm over the prospect of relinquishing Louisiana to 
Spain, and declared that under the circumstances he thought 
that the province had better stay in French hands.* The pre- 
liminaries of the cession to Spain having thus been concluded, 
nothing further about them is mentioned in the diplomatic corre- 
spondence of the time.^ Only the royal signatures, the one of 
ratification, the other of confirmation, were formally lacking to 
make the transaction complete. 

* Cf. the letter of Louis XV, p. 449, note 7. 

^ Archivo Historico-Nacional, Madrid. Estado, Legajo, 3889 A. Wall to Gri- 
maldi, November 13, 1762, citing Grimaldi's letter to him of November 3. 

^ The text of the act is given in French, Historical Collections of Louisiana, 
V, 235-36. It is practically a repetition of what is contained in the letter of Louis 
XV, p. 449, note 7. 

* Archivo Historico-Nacional, Madrid. Estado, Legajo, 3889 A. Wall to 
Grimaldi, November 13, 1782, citing the latter's letter to him of November 3. 

^ Writing to Ossun, November 3, 1762, all that Choiseul has to say about the 
cession is the following; "La lettre du Roy a sa Majeste Catholique et I'acte que 
je veux de signer avec M. de Grimaldi par rapport a la Louisiane rempliront tout 
ce que j'aurois a vous dire sur la matiere interesante, dont il s'agit. Les lumieres 
superieures et le coeur du roy d'Espagne suplieront a tout le reste." Simancas, 
Estado, Legajo, 4552. 



No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 451 

On November 10 the French ambassador at Madrid informed 
Charles III of the proposed gift of Louisiana, and handed him 
the letter of his Bourbon kinsman. "The reply of his Majesty, in 
liis first impulse," wrote Wall to Grimaldi, 

I assure you was worth any province whatever: "I say, no, no, my 
cousin is losing altogether too much; I do not want him to lose anything 
in addition for my sake, and would to Heaven I could do yet more for 
him." ^ 

The sentimentality was quite characteristic of Charles III at this 
time, and Wall had some difficulty in persuading him to accept 
the offer .^ On November 13, however, the Spanish king affixed 
his signature to the act of cession, and ten days later Louis XV 
confirmed the deed of gift.^ Not until December 2 did Charles 
III send a personal acknowledgment of the favor.* 

The act of France, first in offering Louisiana, almost the last 
vestige of her colonial dominions, to England, as a means of sav- 
ing Florida for Spain, and then of ceding it outright to her ally 
as a partial recompense for what Spain had lost in the common 
struggle, was a singular mixture of GalHc impulsiveness with 
GalHc poHcy. The apparent generosity of the deed is almost 
pathetic. It would be so in fact had France really valued Lou- 

* Ibid. Wall to Grimaldi, November 13, 1762. 

' "This stroke of generosity is one of great policy, and we have had some trouble 
to make the king accept it, and let himself be persuaded for the same political 
reason that actuated its offer." Wall to Roda, November 16, 1762, quoted in 
Danvila, Historia del Reinado de Carlos III, t. ii, p. 80. "When once the king 
had overcome his first generous repugnance that his cousin should lose even a 
hand's breadth of land, he at length acquiesced and ratified the cession." Archivo 
Historico-Nacional, Madrid. Estado, Legajo, 3889 A. Wall to Grimaldi, No- 
vember 13, 1762. 

' Text in French, Historical Collections of Louisiana, v, p. 239. 

* Following is the portion that concerns Louisiana: "j'ay 6t6 charme que V. 
M. ait saisie le moment de faire la paix, et je ne me souviendrai des pertes que par 
le regret que j'auray toujours, quelles n'ont pas 6t6 aussi utiles a la f ranee et a la 
gloire de V. M., que je me I'etois propose, en partageant ses dangers et d'avoir et^ 
oblige de ceder aux pressants instances de V. M. dans I'acceptation de la Lou- 
isiane! le M' D'ossun, son ambassadeur, sfait combien mon Coeur a combatu 
contre la sagesse des \'ues politiques qui ont engage V. M. a m'en faire la cession, et 
cependant sans I'espoir que j'ay de pouvoir un jour Marquer a la France les memes 
sentimens je m'y serois constament refuse." Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 4552. 



452 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX. 

isiana/ and were one able to prove the sincerity and disinterested- 
ness of the motives that called it forth. Rather than pathetic, 
the performance was almost ludicrous in its precipitation of what 
must have been a foregone conclusion ever since the offer to Eng- 
land was made. Even prior to this last event France had averred 
her willingness to part with Louisiana.^ After the English had 
rejected the province, to tender it to Spain was assuredly a most 
natural and logical proceeding. The precipitation, furthermore, 
lay not merely in shifting the cession from one country to another, 
but rather in the actual eagerness with which the French shufHed 
off their ancient possession. Indeed they were actually afraid 
that Spain might not take Louisiana, or that Charles III might 
revoke his acceptance of it.^ The ludicrous character of the 
French share in the cession also appears in the absolute trans- 
parency of the economic and political motives involved. Men of 
less diplomatic discernment than those old masters of statecraft. 
Wall and Grimaldi, could have fathomed them without great 
effort. 

In view of the facts and deductions already considered, there- 
fore, the actual cession of Louisiana to Spain ought to occasion 
no more surprise now than it entailed diplomatic negotiation in 
1762. To begin with, the French experiment at colonization in 
Louisiana had been a flat failure. The province was a useless 
and costly burden.* If France could only shift it from her own 

* "Une colonic franjaise pleine d'avenir, vierge du fer ennemi, dernier reste 
de notre empire continental d'Amerique etait cedee comme un troupeau." Mar- 
tin, Histoire de France, t xv, p. 595. 

* Cf. supra, p. 447 and note 3. 

* Gayarre describes the precautions taken by the French government to ward 
off this distressing possibility. He says: "When Kerlerec, the former governor, 
sent to the French government from the Bastile a memorial showing the utility 
for France to convert Louisiana in concert vsdth Spain into a commercial depot, 
in order to render the colony profitable, the minister to whom the memorial was 
referred endorsed it: ' considering that there are in this memorial some details wliich 
might point out to the Court of Madrid proximate causes of conflict with the Eng- 
lish, and therefore render the cession of Louisiana less acceptable to Spain, it 
seems proper that this memorial be recast so as to produce a favorable impression 
upon that government.' " History of Louisiana, 3d ed., ii, p. 107. 

* At the very time of the cession, d'Abbadie, the governor of Louisiana, had 
notified the French government on repeated occasions that the colony was in a 
"state of complete destitution," a veritable "chaos of iniquities," and that to re- 



No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 453 

shoulders to those of Spain, it would be a wise stroke of economy. 
Could that be done under the guise of a magnanimous apprecia- 
tion of services performed, it would be still wiser as a political 
move. But if the donation of Louisiana would tend to quiet the 
querulous grumbhngs of Spain about contraband trade in the 
Gulf of Mexico, and to keep that colonial beldame faithful to the 
Family Compact, in case of a renewal of the contest with England 
— and all of it in exchange for practically less than nothing — 
that would be a masterly stroke of statesmanship indeed. 

Considered from the political standpoint, the purpose of France 
in ceding Louisiana to Spain was not, as has been commonly sup- 
posed, to grant Spain a compensation for the loss of Florida.^ 
That was merely the ostensible object of the cession. Intrinsi- 
cally, to both France and Spain, Florida was worth nothing. As 
a bar to the entrance of contraband trade into the Gulf of Mexico, 
and as a station for guardacostas the port of Pensacola had been 
useful enough. But when the French had ceded to England the 
river and port of Mobile, the value of Pensacola became sensibly 
diminished, for the act brought with it precisely what the Span- 
iards desired most to avoid — the assignment to the English of a 
foothold upon the Gulf.^ Even with the retention of Pensacola 
Spain could no longer maintain her jealous policy of hermetically 
sealing the Gulf of Mexico against the commerce of other nations, 
if indeed, she ever had succeeded in enforcing it absolutely.^ A 
more cogent reason than the bestowment of an indemnity for the 
loss of Pensacola was that of suppressing the French contraband 
trade, both overland and maritime, with the Spanish colonies 
around the Gulf, which had had New Orleans as its centre. In 

store a proper degree of order it would be necessarj' to employ "measures of an 
extreme character." Cf. Gayarre, History of Louisiana, 3d ed., ii, 108. 

' The prevalent opinion is stated for example by Martin as follows: "Par une 
convention secrete signee le meme jour que les preliminaires le roi de France 
promettait la Louisiane au roi d'Espagne pour le dedommager de la perte de la 
Floride, et de I'impossibilite ou Ton etait de rendre Minorque a I'Espagne." 
Histoire de France, t. xv, p. 594. The last statement is wholly a conjecture, with- 
out documentary foundation. Like most of his Spanish confreres, the French 
writer interprets the cession very superficially. Cf. however the somewhat vague 
opinion of Danvila, infra, p. 454, note 3. Cf. also p. 456. 

* Cf. supra, p. 441 ct seq. 

^ Cf. the statement of Ferrer del Rio, infra, p. 454, note 3. 



454 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX. 

this way France would dry up a source of chronic dispute with 
Spain.^ But the dominant purpose of France, after all, it would 
seem was to assuage the wounds and sorrows of war, and to assure 
the continued subservience of her whilom ally to the French 
dynastic policy.^ 

On the part of the Spaniards the cession of Louisiana awak- 
ened neither surprise nor enthusiasm nor gratitude.^ Personal 
modesty and a sense of compassion for a kinsman in distress 
were commingled in the sentimental utterances of Charles III 
which apparently betokened a disinclination to accept the prov- 
ince. It is quite probable, however, that the king's Spanish pride 
recoiled from the tacit enactment of the role of a suppliant to 
French bounty, making him slow to accept the positive advan- 
tages, if any, the newly acquired American wilderness might 
bring. Through an analysis of this calculation of the Spanish 
monarch and his ministers one may arrive at the motives that 
caused the acceptance of the cession.* 

^ Cf. infra, p. 156, note 4. 

^ A careful interpretation of the circumstances of the cession, and intensive 
reading of the letter of Louis XV, are quite sufi&cient to establish the truth of this 
assertion. For additional evidence of a documentary character, see ijifra, p. 456, 
note 4. Danvila, it \vill be observed, states this view of the cession negatively 
by showing what Spain should have avoided. Cf. infra, note 13. 

' At this point it might be well to give the opinions of several of the more promi- 
nent Spanish historians, relative to the significance of the cession of Louisiana. 
"As a compensation for the loss of Florida," remarks Lafuente, " Spain obtained 
. . . what was left of Louisiana, which in fact was for Charles III a burden and a 
care rather than an indemnity or a recompense." Historia de Espaiia, ed. 1862, 
t. X, p. 324. "The fact that Louis XV by a bit of crafty deceit forced the acqui- 
sition of Louisiana upon Charles III," declares Ferrer del Rio, "was far from 
affording any compensation for such a loss [i.e. of Florida]. That new state not 
only troubled the king with the disagreeable task of governing subjects ill-disposed 
to his service, but threatened him also with the dangerous contingency of a war 
with Great Britain." Historia del Reinado de Carlos III, ed. 1856, t. i, p. 377. 
Danvila is the most recent and best infonned of the historians who have dealt 
especially with the reign of Charles III. He says: "The cession of Louisiana on 
the part of France as a means of rendering our misfortunes less acute remedied 
the situation and consequences of the past war in no respect. It served merely 
to demonstrate . . . the necessity of modifying the course of policy, and for the 
future of relying wholly upon one's own resources when about to undertake those 
enterprises which every self-respecting nation is obliged to inaugurate when the 
question arises of defending the integrity of one's country." Historia del Rei- 
nado de Carlos III, t. ii, p. 84. 

* See infra, p. 456, note 4. 



No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 455 

The disadvantages involved in the acquisition of Louisiana 
were obvious enough. Neglect and misgovernment by France had 
brought the province into a deplorable condition. The lack also 
of any adequate system of taxation for the support of government 
and the maintenance of the church made Louisiana, in the eyes 
of Spain, a pauper colony, a sort of public charge that probably 
could not take care of itself financially or otherwise. It was the 
first colony Spain had ever held that had not been settled origi- 
nally by Spaniards. A new system of colonial administration 
and different social institutions would have to be superimposed 
upon the French inhabitants, who probably would be disaffected 
and hard to govern. Its proximity to the English colonial do- 
minion on the other side of the Mississippi, moreover, might en- 
gender friction and perhaps bring on war with Great Britain. 
Nor was anything known about the nature or value of Louisiana 
itself, beyond the sparse settlements along the Mississippi; and 
these were quite insignificant. As a substitute for Florida, finally, 
the odds of intrinsic value appeared about equal. 

But these drawbacks lost their importance before the arguments 
in favor of accepting and retaining Louisiana. To begin with, 
the great benefits to be derived from an adherence to the Family 
Compact were not perhaps quite so patent to the Spaniards as to 
the French, but at all events it was not the part of wisdom to 
alienate France by a rejection of her gift.^ Besides, the posses- 
sion of Louisiana was useful, if for no other reason than that the 
Mississippi furnished an admirable line of demarcation for the 
Spanish dominions in North America. Apart from this consid- 
eration, however, if Spain did not take the province it might fall 
eventually into the power of the Enghsh.^ Developed under the 

* "A great influence with the king has been the consideration of not losing the 
effect of so fine a deed, the air of cordiality with which the two courts will appear 
before the world, serving to bring together the two nations still more." Archive 
Historico-Nacional, Madrid. Estado, Legajo, 3889 A. Wall to Griraaldi, No- 
vember 13, 1762. 

' "Lorsque cette malheureuse convention fut rendue publique le cabinet de 
Versailles tacha d'apaiser I'opinion, profondement blessee, en insinuant dans 
ses justifications oflacieuses que la Louisiane ^tait menacee du mSme sort que le 
Canada, et que Ton n'abandonnait que ce que Ton n'efit pu garder longtemps." 
Martin, Histoire de France, t. xv, p. 595. 



456 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol. XIX. 

auspices of that mighty and enterprising people, Louisiana would 
assuredly become dangerous to the peace and safety of Mexico. Even 
in the hands of Spain the province was too vast in extent to serve 
as a very effective barrier against English aggression. Still, on the 
whole, Louisiana had better be even loosely defended by Spaniards 
than suffered to become a sturdy and vigorous Enghsh colony, 
with its fortified posts well advanced toward the Mexican frontier. 
All things considered, from the commercial and political point 
of view furthermore, the loss of Florida had been quite a heavy 
blow to Spain.* The acquisition of Pensacola, added to the ces- 
sion of Mobile from France and the previous possession of Jamaica, 
gave the English such a hold upon the Gulf of Mexico that the 
imposition of any adequate check upon their contraband trade 
with the Mexican region appeared well-nigh hopeless.^ But if 
the English had thus been admitted to the Gulf it was some satis- 
faction at least to know that with New Orleans under Spanish 
control, French smuggling would be suppressed.^ Lastly, that 
Louisiana possessed some natural wealth could not be doubted, 
and under a wise administration its resources could be developed, 
alike to the profit of Spain and to that of its new province.* 

1 Cf. supra, p. 453. 

^ By the acquisition of Florida "the English realized their desire of old to get 
a footing on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, so as to carry on their commerce 
with New Spain, the only section of country in the western Indies free up to that 
time from their ilUcit traffic." Ferrer del Rio, Historia del Reinado de Carlos 
III, ed. 1856, t. i, p. 377. In his correspondence with Tanucci, the Neapolitan 
minister of Charles III, Wall declared that, in his opinion, the real advantage 
which England gained by the acquisition of Florida was nothing more than a 
greater faciUty for navigating the Gulf of Mexico. Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 
5978. Wall to Tanucci, December 14 and 28, 1762. 

^ Cf. infra, note 4. 

* Several of the motives above discussed as actuating both France and Spain 
are set forth in an official brief (extracto), prepared about 1767 for the Council 
of the Indies. It states that the king of France decided to cede Louisiana, prin- 
cipally because he desired to "maintain the closest possible union and friendship 
with Spain." Since also, the Spanish commerce with the Indies was so flourish- 
ing, he did not wish to have a settlement on the Gulf of Mexico which was likely 
to carry on an illicit traffic, practically impossible to prevent, and which "contrary 
to his intentions might lead eventually to unpleasant disputes. To this end he 
authorized the Duke of Choiseul to draw up an act of cession, pure and simple. 
Aware of these circumstances, his Catholic Majesty . . . was inclined to accept 
it for various considerations: 



No. 3.] THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 457 

Thus having described the cession of Louisiana in 1762, and 
explained the motives of France and Spain in accomphshing it, 
a few v^ords remain to be said about its meaning for the history 
of the United States. Few diplomatic transactions have exhib- 
ited so strange a medley of motives and emotions — at once those 
of impulsiveness, policy, relief, reluctance and practical calcula- 
tion, all of them pervaded with a tinge of indifference and care- 
lessness. To the Frenchman and to the Spaniard of 1762 the 
transfer of a vast and unknown tract in the wilds of North America 
was, on the whole, a rather trivial performance. Had they real- 
ized that the Louisiana territory stretched over 900,000 square 

" I. Because, by adding to his dominions of New Spain the territories which 
his Most Christian Majesty had possessed between them and the River Missis- 
sippi, this river from its mouth to its source would serve as a fixed and definite 
boundary for his royal possessions in North America. 

" 2. Because, by this acquisition the French would be deprived of a point of 
vantage from which they had carried on very extensive smuggling operations in 
the Gulf of Mexico, and more especially along the shores of Campeachy and Hon- 
duras, not to mention what they were accustomed to do in the interior of the cotrsitr}'. 

" 3. Because, although granting that this new acquisition might be i^ heavy bur- 
den upon the royal exchequer — in view of the fact that no taxation had been 
levied there, even to the extent of tithes for the maintenance of the clergy and 
worship, it being necessary to provide for it by a regular appropriation — one must 
bear in mind that this appropriation would have a substantial return from the 
diminution of ilUcit traffic, and from the advantages that would accrue to the 
king's vassals by reason of the commerce of that new dominion. 

"4. Because, were his Majesty to decline the cession, the eventual fate ... of 
the colony would be doubtful; and if by any chance it might fall into the hands 
of England, in time of peace it would be steadily developed and fortified in the 
direction of the frontiers of our dominions, it would become widened out along 
the Missouri and other rivers, the good will of the Indians would be won over, 
evil reports would be circulated against us, and in case of an outbreak of war the 
colony would be close to us and well equipped for attacks by way of the pro\'inces 
of Texas and New Mexico. It was never believed that this . . . colony would 
become a bulwark for our America; the supposition has always been that should 
the English intend to invade it, even if we had a large force of troops there, we 
could not seriously check their movements along an extended frontier of five hun- 
dred leagues." The last sentence of the extracto is rather difficult to translate, 
and requires a paraphrase to make its meaning reasonably clear. The text is as 
follows: "Pero se considero que no seria lo misneo entrar de nuevo que tenerla 
ocupada de antemano, y hallarse ya adelantados y fortificados a nuestras espal- 
das." "But the consideration prevailed that the invasion of Louisiana, were it a 
Spanish province, would be something quite different from suffering it to be de- 
veloped and fortified by the English at our very back." Archivo Historico-Na- 
clonal, Madrid. Estado, Legajo, 38S9 h. 



458 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [Vol XIX. 

miles — an area more than four times that of France or Spain — 
but little difference, probably, would have been made in the readi- 
ness of France to part with it, and in the comparative reluctance 
of Spain to take it. Perhaps it might not be too much to say that 
in the bizarre diplomacy of 1762 over the cession of Louisiana to 
Spain, the fate of the United States yet unborn was decided. Had 
France assigned the territory to England in that year, or if she 
had retained it, the history of the period 1 789-181 5 justifies the 
belief that the result would have been the same; the region must 
have become a part of the British colonial dominion. When the 
United States was in its infancy, all conditions, geographical, 
political, social and economic, pointed toward the formation of 
two confederacies, one along the Atlantic seaboard, the other 
along the Mississippi. For many years, if not for all time, that 
river must have been at once the western boundary of the United 
States, and, even had that country retained its unity, a bar to its 
national development. 

However unconscious and unwilling her course of action, Spain 
has been the most potent external factor in the territorial expan- 
sion and aggrandizement of the United States. Most of the great 
republic's domain was once under the Spanish sway. The ces- 
sion of Louisiana to Spain in 1762 was the necessary prelude to 
the purchase of 1803, and the story of the West beyond the Mis- 
sissippi has been in the highest degree the story of our national 
prosperity and power. 

William R. Shepherd. 



THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN. 



BY 

WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD. 



REPRINTED FROM POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 
Vol. XIX., No. 3. 



BOSTON. 
PUBLISHED BY GINN & CO., 

1904. 



